


### Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station



IMC 0350 Meeting



#### **Desired Outcomes**

- •Provide an update of our progress toward restart
- •Update key areas for improvement prior to restart
  - -Calculations
  - -Corrective Action Program
  - -Operations Improvement Action Plan

Lew Myers
Chief Operating Officer - FENOC



### **Meeting Agenda**

Lew Myers
Lim Dayyana
Jim Powers
Bob Schrauder
Mark Bezilla
Mike Roder
Craig Hengge
Clark Price

# Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC








Lew Myers
Chief Operating Officer - FENOC



- Completed four NRC Restart Checklist Items
  - -2.d Extent of Condition of Boric Acid in Systems Outside of Containment
  - -3.c Quality Audits and Self-Assessment of Programs
  - -3.i Completeness and Accuracy of Required Records and Submittals to the NRC
  - -5.a Licensee's Restart Action Plan
- •Completed 22 items; 9 remaining



- Actions completed
  - -Restart Test Plan
  - -High Pressure Injection Pumps #2 installed
  - -Electrical breaker coordination modifications underway





- Actions completed (continued)
  - -Employee alignment training
  - -First all-employee survey on Safety Culture
  - -Safety Conscious Work Environment survey
  - -Management walk-down of open work orders
  - -Restart Overview Panel conditional restart approval
  - -Emergency Preparedness



- •Items for next ROP meeting
  - -Power Ascension Plan
  - -Electric System Co-ordination Improvement
  - -Service Water Resolution
  - -Containment Air Coolers
  - -High Pressure Injection Pumps
  - -Containment Readiness
  - -Procedure Use and Adherence Training
  - -Operations Improvement Action Plan
  - -Emergency Preparedness at Restart
  - -Cycle 14: Operational Improvement Plan (Engineering and Maintenance Backlog, Equipment Reliability, Engineering Calculations)





Jim Powers
Director - Engineering



- Calculation Review and Assurance History
  - -System Health Assurance Plan Review
    - -Safety Function Validation Project (SFVP)
      - -Purpose was to provide assurance of the adequacy of the design for plant safety functions
      - -Review of systems providing significant contribution to core damage frequency (CDF)
      - Design basis calculations demonstrated safety functions in a majority of cases
      - -Calculations improved as required; e.g. ETAP Analysis



- Calculation Process Improvements
  - -NOP-CC-3002, Calculations issued March, 2003
  - -Procedure change training provided
  - -New requirements for Design Interface Evaluation and 50.59
  - -Detailed Design Verification checklist included
- •Independent assessment by Architect/Engineer (A/E), October, 2003
  - -Benchmarked against A/E and large mid-west utility
  - -Identified areas for improvement
  - -Process and implementation



- •Immediate Improvement Actions
  - -Design Engineering realignment and reaffirmation meetings
    - -Procedure types and adherence expectations
    - -Review of A/E assessment results
    - -Supervisors
    - -Engineers
  - -Collective Significance Condition Report issued
    - -CATI and A/E issues included
    - -Each unit reviewed their issues
    - -Assessed affects on results or conclusions
    - -Corrective Actions for Case Study and Model Calculations



- •Immediate Improvement Actions (continued)
  - -Engineering Assessment Board Calculation Review
    - -Detailed review using checklist
    - -Specific objectives developed
    - -Calculation quality Performance Indicator
  - -Requirement to validate older calculations prior to use
  - -Approved funding for electronic calculation index and ATLAS Electronic Design Basis Information Projects
    - -Initiated both projects
    - -Design control improvements



- •Calculation Improvement Plan
  - -Operational Improvement Plan initiation
  - -Details in Design Basis Assessment Report
  - -Procedure improvements
  - -Implementation performance improvement
  - -Critical (Tier 1) calculation meet high quality standards



#### Summary

- -System Health Building Block reviews completed
- -System Design Bases support restart
- -Barriers to ensure calculations quality are in place
- -Continued improvements ongoing






**Bob Schrauder Director - Support Services** 



- Apparent Cause Quality
  - -Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) review
  - -Enhanced procedural requirements
  - -Select group of Apparent Cause Evaluators
  - -Established Qualifications
    - -Initial training
    - -Continued training
    - -Proficiency requirements
  - -Condition Report Analysts
    - -Strengthened roles and responsibilities
    - -Attendance at CARB
    - -Long-tem responsibility for quality







- Documentation quality
  - -Requirements added to procedure
  - -Lessons learned training
  - -Condition Report Analyst review
  - -Performance Improvement Unit reviews



- Management involvement
  - -Business Practice for implementation expectations
  - -Reinstated Management Communication and Teamwork Meeting
  - -Section Manager at CARB for Sections Apparent Causes
  - -Manager review of all open Condition Reports
  - -Senior Leadership Team review of Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality (SCAQs)
  - -Executive leadership review of SCAQs as selected by COO
  - -Company Nuclear Review Board independent review of selected Apparent Causes



#### Trending

- -Quarterly Trend Summary Reports resumed
- -System Health Reports resumed
- -FENOC Manager of Equipment Reliability
- -CREST Statistical Process Control interface created
- -Section assessments planned



- Summary
  - -FENOC has a good Corrective Action Program
  - -Implementation of the Corrective Action Program at Davis-Besse is improving
- Actions Taken to Assure Restart Readiness
  - -On-going CARB review of Condition Reports with specific criteria
  - -Increased management involvement in process
  - -Select qualified Apparent Cause Evaluators
  - -Provide training and strengthen roles and responsibilities of CR analysts
  - -CNRB independent review of Apparent Causes



#### Normal Operating Pressure Test Conclusions



Mark Bezilla
Vice President



#### Desired Outcome

- -Provide you with our conclusions of the 7 Day RCS Integrity Test (Nuclear Operating Pressure (NOP) Test)
  - -Conduct walkdowns of systems
  - -Inspect RCS Leakage
  - -Validate New RCS Leakage Procedure/ FLÜS Leak Monitoring System
  - -Correct identified problems
  - -Goal of achieving Lowest Attainable RCS Leakage
  - -Completion of Post-Maintenance Test Matrix
  - -Operational Readiness Assessment
    - -Organization Structure
    - -Management Effectiveness
    - -Operations Effectiveness



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- •NOP Test successfully accomplished the stated objectives
  - –Areas for improvement were identified



No leakage on incore nozzles (bottom of reactor vessel)



#### •Plant

- –Integrity of the ReactorCoolant System was verified
- –Sensitivity of the RCSLeakage Monitoring Systemwas confirmed
- Sensitivity of the FLÜS LeakMonitoring System wasconfirmed



No leakage noted on CRDM nozzles



### People

- -Predominately exhibited the characteristic and attitude which established an overriding priority towards nuclear safety activities and ensured that issues received the attention warranted by their significance
- -Our assessments were critical of our performance
- -Identified our shortfalls and areas for improvement



**Employee alignment training** 




- Processes
  - -Support safe and reliable plant operation
  - -Identified areas for improvement



#### Conclusion

- -NOP Test was a success
- Areas for improvementidentified
- Operations ImprovementAction Plan established



Overall leak rate of RCS was best in the history of plant





**Mike Roder Manager - Plant Operations** 



### Collective Significance Review

- •Established team
- Reviewed Condition Reports
- Reviewed observation data base
- Reviewed training records
- •Five Areas of Improvement
  - Operations oversight and leadership
  - Transition to operational focus
  - Implementation of standards and expectations
  - Strengthen knowledge and skills
  - Improvements in Condition Report investigation



- Operations Improvement Action Plan
  - -Collective Significance
  - -Industry reviews
  - -Operational Readiness Assessment report
  - -Nuclear Quality Assurance Assessment
- Designed to address four key barriers
  - -Individual Barriers
  - -Program/Process Barriers
  - -Management Barriers
  - -Oversight Barriers



- •Individual Barrier Improvements
  - -Strengthen crew manning
  - -Assessed understanding of expectations
  - -Evaluated standards and expectations for improvements
  - -Reinforcing procedure adherence expectations
  - -Targeting training on integrated operations procedures



- •Program and Procedure Barrier Improvements
  - -Strengthen procedures
    - -Benchmarked against industry leaders
    - -Incorporated lessons learned
    - -Validated on simulator
    - -Focusing on consistent performance
  - -Improved pre-job briefs
  - -Used Systematic Approach to Training to improve knowledge and skills



- •Management Barrier Improvements
  - -Reinforced adherence to on-shift roles
  - -Reduced Operations work hours
  - -Train Site Managers to achieve more critical observations
- Oversight Barrier Improvements
  - -Operational Oversight Managers



- Effectiveness Measures
  - -Successful requalification of Operators
  - -Consistent demonstration of proficiency with plant startup, power Operations, abnormal operating and alarm conditions during training
  - -Operational Oversight Managers qualitative assessment



#### **Operations Improvement Action Plan**

#### Summary

-Upon completion of the Operational Improvement Action Plan, we will be ready for restart



#### **NOP Inspection Results**



**Craig Hengge Engineer - Plant Engineering** 



- •Reactor Vessel Inspections Completed
  - -Incore Nozzle Inspection
  - -CRDM Flange Inspection
  - -Bare Head Inspection



FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company





- •Incore Nozzle Inspection
  - –May 2003 post-cleaning baseline inspection
  - –October 2003 post-NOP test inspection
    - No indication of leakage
    - No visible residue at any nozzle penetration
    - No detectable changes between inspections



- •CRDM Flange Inspection Results
  - -CCW drips found on stator cooling connection
  - Boron found on nameplates and vent ports
  - -No CRDM flange leakage identified











- •Bare Head Inspection Results
  - -Small particles stuck in nozzle annulus
  - Rust trail traced to CCW drips
  - –White streaks on two nozzles from CCW leak
  - No indications of RCS leakage







#### **Bare Head Inspection**








#### **Bare Head Inspection**





### FLÜS Leak Monitoring System

- •FLÜS Leak Monitoring System
  - -First Installation in United States
  - -State-of-the-Art System







## Clark Price Owner - Restart Action Plan



Nov 13/14

- Mode 4/3 Restart Readiness Review Meetings

- Safety Culture Assessment

**Nov 18** 

- Mode 4/3 Restart Readiness **Review Meeting** 

- Systems Readiness Assessment

Nov 20

- Company Nuclear Review Board

- Assessment of Restart Readiness

Nov 24

- Submittal of the Integrated Restart Report to NRC

#### **FirstEnera**

#### **Station Key Events**

- Transition to On-Line Work Control Schedule Dec 1

- Industry Review Team Dec 1-5

- Restart Readiness Assessment

Dec 1/4 - Mode 4/3 Restart Readiness Review Meetings

- Organizational Readiness

- Operations Improvement Action Plan Effectiveness w/ Feedback from the On-shift Oversight
- Readiness for Restart Overview Panel **Action Items**

- December 0350 Public Meeting

Dec 3

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Dec 5 - Restart Overview Panel

- Final Restart Readiness Assessment

Dec 8 - NRC Restart Assessment Team arrives for on-shift inspection of Mode Ascension

Dec 9 - Enter Mode 4

Dec 10 - Enter Mode 3

Dec 11 - Achieve Full Reactor Coolant System
Pressure and Temperature



- Dec 11/12 Mode 2 Restart Readiness Review Meetings
  - Organizational Readiness
  - Operations Improvement Action Plan Effectiveness w/ Feedback from the On-shift Oversight
  - On-Line Work Control Effectiveness
  - Procedure Use & Adherence Effectiveness
  - Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
  - Final Plant Systems Readiness



- Public Meeting for Request for Restart
- Enter Mode 2 (Restart)
- Enter Mode 1
- 65% Hold for Effectiveness Review
- 100% Power
- Post Restart Integrated Test Plan Critique



#### **Closing Comments**



# Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC

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